Southern Historical Society Papers.

Vol. XVIII. Richmond, Va., January-December. 1890.

The Battle Of The Crater, July 30, 1864.

Excerpts from An Address delivered before the A. P. Hill Camp of Confederate Veterans, of Petersburg, Va., in that city, on the 24th of June, 1890.

BY COMRADE GEORGE S. BERNARD.

COMRADES:

It was my fortune as a member of the Petersburg Riflemen, Company E, Twelfth Virginia Infantry, General William Mahone's brigade, to take part in the memorable engagement known as "The Battle of the Crater," and it is now proposed to give some account of the action--to tell a war story from the standpoint of a high private in the rear rank, supplementing information within my personal knowledge with some material drawn from other sources believed to be reliable--this being necessary to a proper understanding of what will be told.

On Saturday morning, the 30th of July, 1864, when the mine under the angle in the Confederate's works around Petersburg, known as "Elliott's sailent," was exploded, blowing up, or burying under the debris of earth and timber, between two hundred and fifty and three hundred officers and men occupying the works at this point, making therein a huge chasm, described in the report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War as "from 150 to 200 feet in length, about 60 in width, and from 25 to 30 feet in depth, and aptly called ' a crater,'" from its resemblance to the mouth of a volcano, Mahone's brigade was occupying the breastworks on the Willcox farm, immediately south of our city--say about a point which would be reached by a prolongation of Adams street. The site of the "Crater," as is well known probably to all now present, is east of the Jerusalem plank-road and about half a mile southeast from Blandford Cemetery, being located a short distance beyond our city limits, in the county of Prince George, on the farm of Mr. T. R. Griffith.

Some time during the night preceding the explosion, our brigade received orders to be "ready to move at a moment's warning," which, of course, indicated that something was expected requiring a movement of the command.

It was well understood that the enemy were mining somewhere on our line, but exactly at what point was not known. A counter-mine was made by the Confederates several hundred yards to the right of the Crater, near the point at which the Confederate breastworks cross the Jerusalem plank-road, as may be seen at this time. At the Elliott salient a counter-mine was begun, but was abandoned for want of proper tools.

The explosion took place between daybreak and sunrise (4:44 A. M. was the exact time), and the impression made upon those hearing it may be likened to that of a nearly simultaneous discharge of several pieces of artillery. The concussion of the atmosphere was unusual. We were all soon in the breastworks. Something extraordinary, we knew, had happened. Soon a report came down the line from the direction of the scene of action that a mine had been exploded and a part of our works blown up and was occupied by the enemy.

A little after six o'clock, when the Crater had been in the enemy's possession for more than an hour, a staff officer rides rapidly past us; General Mahone's headquarters, which were at the Branch House, just west of the Willcox farm, is the point of destination of this staff-officer, who is Colonel Charles S. Venable, aide-de-camp to General Lee. Colonel Venable is bearing a message to General Mahone, who was then, as he had been since the wounding of General Longstreet at the battle of the Wilderness, in command of Anderson's division, which was composed of the brigades of General William Mahone (Virginians), General A. R. Wright (Georgians), General J. C. C. Saunders (Alabamians), General N.H. Harris (Mississippians), and General Joseph Finegan (Floridians).

The message borne to General Mahone is to send at once two of his brigades to the support of General Bushrod R. Johnson, who commanded that part of the Confederate lines embracing the works now in the enemy's hands.

Very soon, under orders received, the men of Mahone's brigade of Virginians and Wright's brigade of Georgians, began to drop back from their places in the breastworks, one by one, into the cornfield in their rear, and, when they were well out of sight of the enemy, the line was formed and the two brigades marched to the Ragland House, were there halted, and the men were directed to divest themselves of knapsacks, blanket-rolls and other baggage; an order which to the veteran plainly bespoke serious work, and that in the near future.

In a written statement made by Colonel Venable in 1872, referring to the carrying of the message from General Lee to General Mahone, he says:

"He sent me directly to General Mahone (saying that to save time the order need not be sent through General A. P. Hill), with the request that he would send, at once, two of the brigades of his division to the assistance of General Johnson. I rode rapidly to General Mahone's line, and delivered my message. He immediately gave orders to the commanders of the Virginia and Georgia brigades to move to the salient and report to General Johnson. The troops moved promptly, the Virginia brigade (General Weisiger) in front. We rode on together, at the head of the column, General Mahone giving instructions to his officers and inquiring as to the condition of things at the sailent. When we reached the peach orchard, in rear of the Ragland House, noticing that the men were encumbered with their knapsacks, he halted the column, and caused both brigades to put themselves in battle trim. While the men were throwing aside their knapsacks he turned to me and said: 'I can't send my brigades to General Johnson--I will go with them myself.' He then moved the column towards the opening of the covered way, which led to the Crater salient. I left him at this point to report to General Lee, who, meantime, had come to the front. I found him sitting with General Hill, among the men in the lines, at a traverse near the River salient. When I told him of the delivery of the message, and that General Mahone had concluded to lead the two brigades himself, he expressed gratification."

Leaving the Ragland House, we marched along the edge of the hills skirting Lieutenant Run to New Road, or Hickory street, and entered this road a hundred or two more yards east of the brigade, then marched westwardly to within a few yards of the bridge over this run, and then filed northwardly down the ravine on the east side of the run to Hannon's (now Jackson's) old ice-pond; here entered a military foot-path leading along the pond eastward to the head of the pond; thence filed eastwardly up a ravine along the same military foot-path to the Jerusalem plank-road. We are now at a point a few feet from the southwestern corner of the Jewish cemetery of to-day, and the position of the foot-path in this ravine along which we came is yet plainly marked.

At the plank-road we are halted and counter-march by regiments, thereby placing each regiment with its left in front. Here we see on the roadside, General Mahone, with other officers, dismounted, their horses standing near by. Mahone had then reported to General Beauregard at the headquarters of General Johnson, which were at the old house, which, until a few years ago, stood on the crest of the hill a short distance northwest from the northwest corner of Blandford Cemetery and near the road leading southwardly up the hill to the cemetery. It was now about half-past eight o'clock, and the enemy were just as they had been for nearly four hours, in quiet occupation of the Crater, with about one hundred and fifty yards of our breastworks to the south and some two hundred yards of these works to the north of the Crater, reaching down to the foot of the hill on the north side. To these limits on either side the Confederates occupying the lines north and south of the Crater confined them.

General Mahone, having had the regiments counter-march at the Jerusalem plank-road, goes ahead along the covered way leading directly across the road, southeastwardly to the ravine in rear and west of the Confederate works now occupied by the enemy. Ascending the little knoll at the point where the ravine is entered by another smaller ravine or gully, into which the zig-zag covered way led and terminated, he sees the Confederate works filled to overflowing with Federal troops, and, counting eleven regimental flags, estimates the Federal force in possession as at least 3,000 men. The situation is an extremely grave one. His own little force of two brigades, then approaching in the covered way, if assailed in this position, would be inevitably cut to pieces and destroyed. So Mahone orders Courier J. H. Blakemore to go at once back and bring up the Alabama brigade (Saunders') to come by the same route which the Virginia and Georgia brigades had taken.

Whilst General Mahone is at the knoll surveying the enemy and arranging for the attack, we are cautiously approaching the ravine along the covered way. At the angles, where the enemy could see a moving column with ease, the men are ordered to run quickly by, one man at a time; which was done for the double purpose of concealing the approach of a body of troops and of lessening the danger of passing rifle balls at these exposed points.

I should have mentioned that there was constant shelling as we moved along our route from the breastworks at Willcox's farm, but we were well protected by the shelter of intervening hills. As we passed the Harmon pond, I remember seeing a solid shot, or shell, fired from one of the enemy's guns, descend into the water but a few feet from our moving line.

Arriving at the ravine, we found General Mahone standing near the mouth of the gully into which the covered way led and along which we were filing into the ravine, now and then exchanging word of encouragement with some passing officer or man in the ranks.

In this ravine are some artillery men, with one or more mortars in position; and I have a strong impression that I saw, skirting the slope of the hill, a slight line of breastworks which looked as if it had been made that morning for temporary shelter by men working with their bayonets.

Soon the line of battle is formed; the Twelfth Virginia on the left of the brigade, the Sixth Virginia on the right, the brigade sharpshooters on the right of the Sixth. The middle regiments were the Sixteenth, the Forty-first and Sixty-first--the Sixty-first being the centre regiment.

On the field to-day may be seen a tree that marks the position of the right of this line of battle.

The line formed, we advanced some twenty yards up the slope of the hill and lie flat on our faces. In this position we are concealed from the view of the enemy, now two hundred yards in our front.

Our brigade is under the command of Colonel D. A. Weisiger, colonel of the Twelfth, whilst the Twelfth is commanded by Captain Richard W. Jones, the Sixth by Colonel George T. Rogers, the Sixteenth by Captain L. R. Kilby, the Forty-first by Major William H. Etheridge, and the Sixty-first by Lieutenant-Colonel William H. Stewart. The sharp-shooters are commanded by Captain Wallace Broadbent. A few minutes after we take the recumbent position, Captain Drury A. Hinton, acting aid-de-camp to Colonel Weisiger, walks along the line and directs the regimental officers to instruct their men to reserve their fire until the enemy are reached. As soon as Captain Hinton passed down the line Captain Jones stepped out in front of us, as we lay on the ground, and, with great coolness of manner, said: "Men, you are called upon to charge and recapture our works, now in the hands of the enemy. They are only about one hundred yards distant. The enemy can fire but one volley before the works are reached. At the command' forward' every man is expected to rise and move forward at a double quick and with a yell. Every man is expected to do his duty."

This short address, delivered under the gravest of circumstances, was impressive in the extreme, and well calculated to nerve up the men to do their best work. The words and manner of the speaker sank deep in my memory.

How Captain Jones came to deliver this address is explained in a letter written by him to General Mahone from Oxford, Miss., under date of January 3, 1877:

"On getting my regiment in position in the ravine your courier delivered me a message to report to you at the right of the brigade. I went immediately, walking in front of the brigade, and found all of the other regimental commanders before you when I arrived. At that moment you gave the order to have the Georgia brigade moved up rapidly to its position on the right of the Virginia brigade, and then turning to the officers you delivered a stirring address to this effect: 'The enemy have our works.' The line of men which we have here is the only barrier to the enemy's occupying the city of Petersburg. There is nothing to resist his advance. Upon us devolves the duty of driving him from his strong position in our front and re-establishing the Confederate lines. We must carry his position immediately by assaulting it. If we don't carry it by the first attack we shall renew the attack as long as there is a man of us left or until the works are ours. Much depends upon prompt, vigorous, simultaneous movements.' I do not profess to give your words, but your address and orders were given with such peculiar emphasis and under such impressive circumstances that the sentiments were indelibly inscribed on my mind. I at once placed myself in front of my command and had bayonets fixed; I explained to them the character of our work and perilous position of our army."

"The works are only one hundred yards distant," said Captain Jones--a fortunate mistake. They were, in point of fact, two hundred yards distant.

"The enemy can fire but one volley before the works are reached." A timely reminder was this, as, whilst advising the men of the gravity of the situation, it warned them of the great importance of a quick movement towards the foe.

Let me here mention an incident: Lying next on my right was a young friend, Emmet Butts, a member of the bar of our city. His proper position was on my left. Having a superstitious belief that the safest place for a man in battle is generally his proper place, I said to my friend, "Emmet, suppose we change places? I am in yours, and you in mine." "Certainly," was his reply, with a pleasant smile; and we then changed places. I never saw the poor fellow alive afterwards. Soon after reaching the works he fell, his forehead pierced with a minnie ball.

Immediately after Captain Jones delivered his address the expected command, "forward," was given--by whom I could not of my personal knowledge say. Each man sprang to his feet, and moved forward, as commanded, at a double-quick, and with a yell.

The line was about one hundred and fifty yards in length when it started forward, but with the men moving at slightly different paces and lengthening out a little on the right as the right regiments and sharp-shooters obliqued to the right towards the crater, before we were half across the field, the line had probably lengthened a hundred or two feet, and widened to twenty feet or more, and the men thus moving forward with open ranks, no spectacle of war could well have been more inspiriting than the impetuous charge of this column of veterans, every man of whom appreciated the vital importance of getting to the works and closing with the enemy in the quickest possible time--every man feeling that to halt or falter for a moment on the way was fatal.

The charge was probably as splendid as any of which history has made record. Just as we were well over the brow of the hill, I cast my eyes to the right, and I will ever carry a vivid impression of the rapid, but steady and beautiful, movement of the advancing line of some 800 men--the greater part of whom, being to my right, were within the range of my vision--as our five Virginia regiments, their five battle flags, borne by as many gallant color-bearers, floating in the bright sunlight of that July morning, and the battalion of sharpshooters double-quicked across the field they were unconsciously making famous.

A Federal soldier thus describes the charge:

"The second brigade had hardly raised their heads when the cry broke out from our men, 'The rebels are charging. Here they come.' Looking to the front I saw a splendid line of gray coming up the ravine on the run. Their left was nearly up to the bomb-proofs, and their line extended off into the smoke as far as we could see. They were coming', and coming with a rush. We all saw that they were going straight for the Second brigade."

Getting within ten paces of the ends of the little ditches or traverses, which led out perpendicularly from the main trench of our breastworks some ten or fifteen paces, to my surprise I saw a negro soldier getting up from a recumbent position on the ground near my feet. He was the first colored soldier I ever saw, and this was my first knowledge of the fact that negro troops were before us. I had not then fired my rifle, and I might easily have killed this man, but regarding him as a prisoner, I had no disposition to hurt him. Looking then directly ahead of me, within thirty feet of where I stood, I saw in the trench of the breastworks crowds of men, white and black, with arms in their hands, as closely jammed and packed together as we sometimes see pedestrians on the crowded sidewalk of a city, and seemingly in great confusion and alarm. I distinctly noticed the countenances and rolling eyes of the terror-stricken negroes. I particularly noticed in the hands of one of the frightened creatures the new silk of a large and beautiful stand of colors, the staff swaying to and fro as the color-bearer, his eyes fixed in terrified gaze at his armed adversaries, was being pushed and jostled by his comrades. With my gun still loaded I might have fired into this mass of men, but I regarded these also as practically our prisoners. Casting my' eyes upon the ground over and beyond the breastworks--east of them, I mean--I there saw large numbers of the enemy retreating to their own breastworks. Many, however, were taking shelter behind--that is, on the east side, or outside, of our breastworks, as I could see from the tops of their caps, just over the parapet. Into a squad of those I saw retreating to their own works, I fired my rifle, and not stopping to note the damage done by my shot, or to enquire who was thereby hurt, I jumped into one of the little ditches leading out from the main trench. This ditch was about as deep as I was high and about eighteen inches wide. Proceeding down it towards the trench, or main ditch, I was suddenly confronted by a negro soldier at the other end of it, standing with his gun pointed towards me at "a ready," and looking me in the face with a grin on his.

As may be imagined, I was now in quite a predicament. What should I do? Shoot the fellow I could not--my gun, having been just fired, was empty. Bayonet him I could not, as I had no bayonet on my gun. I had lost my bayonet at the battle of the Wilderness, and glad of having done so, as I was thus lawfully relieved of that much weight on a march, I had never bothered myself about getting another, never having expected to get close enough to an armed enemy to need it. Nor could I club this man; the narrowness of the ditch prevented. Nor could I turn my back upon him with safety. But there was a protecting hand to save me. Just in front of me, and to my right, was a large recess in the earth, perpendicular to the little ditch in which I stood and parallel to the main ditch or trench, large enough for a horse to stand in--say eight feet in length, four in width and of the same depth with the little ditch. Into this recess, by a rapid stride to my front and right, I made my way, and there loaded my rifle in the quickest possible time; no muzzle-loader was ever loaded in less time. I was now less than five feet from a trench full of Federal soldiers with arms in their hands, and was in a position critical and perilous in the extreme.

. . .

About the time I got my rifle loaded, Comrade John R. Turner, the esteemed adjutant of our camp, then a member of my company, came into the recess, and certainly one and possibly two other Confederates.

Ready now to give the enemy a shot, I looked around the corner towards the place near the intersection of the ditch with the trench where I saw the fellow who pointed his gun and grinned at me, but he was not to be seen. All I could see in this direction were the ends of rifles and bayonets held by men in the trench concealed from my view by the angle of the trench and small ditch. Whilst I was making this observation, a Federal soldier in the trench near this angle fired his gun, and its muzzle was close enough to the dry earthen angle to make the dust rise in the air as the wind of the exploding rifle-charge knocked away a part of the sharp corner of the trench and ditch at this angle.

Finding in this direction nothing at which to shoot, although only a wall of some five feet intervened between the place where I stood and a ditch full of men in blue, I stood tip-toe and looked eastward towards the ground beyond our breastworks. Here I saw numbers of the enemy crowding behind the outer or eastward part of our works, apparently three or four deep, the tops of their caps only being visible, and there were at the same time others of the enemy retreating across the open field between our works and theirs, and at these I fired this, my second shot, and again reloaded.

About this time a conference took place between Comrade Turner and myself as to the propriety of remaining in the place where we then stood. The suggestion was made that we fall back to our line, I mean that part of it represented by the Petersburg Riflemen, all or the greater part of whom, we believed, were standing or lying at or near the ends of the ditches leading out from the trench. We agreed, however, that whilst we were in a very dangerous position, it was our safest. Besides this, a backward movement, by even as few as two men, might have started others, perhaps the whole line, to falling back. So we concluded to remain where we were. Had we attempted to fall back, we would have gone from a position in which we were comparatively safe (unless our whole line had been beaten back) to one of great danger, and would probably have lost our lives.

Both of us now fired several shots from this place--probably four or five. I then thought I would take an enfilading fire at the enemy in the trench to my right, who were in plain view, there being an angle in the breastworks to our right, the recess in which Comrade Turner and myself stood being so located as to enable us, when on tip-toe, to look southeastwardly down the trench towards the Crater, some seventy-five yards to our right. When taking a survey of this part of the trench I saw men struggling there, which indicated that some of our men opposite that part of the breastworks had effected an entrance therein. Seeing this I determined to withhold my proposed shot down the trench. Just at this time, looking to my left, I saw Federal soldiers coming out of, and many of our men passing into, the trench along the little ditch by which Comrade Turner and myself had entered; whereupon I went at once into the trench into which the Confederates were now entering in numbers from the little ditches up and down the line.

. . .

But the works are not yet ours. To the north of the Crater and in the ditches immediately behind and west of it the Confederates were in possession; but the Crater itself is held by a large number of the enemy--several hundred of them--not yet ready to surrender. There were also some fifty yards of our works south of Crater in the enemy's possession. To drive out these, about ten o'clock--a little more than an hour after the charge made by the Virginia brigade--Wright's brigade of Georgian's were ordered forward from the same ravine from which the Virginia charged; but such was the severity of the fire the men of this gallant brigade were forced to oblique to the left and take shelter among the works now in the hands of the Virginians, thus failing in their attempt. When this charge was about to be made, the Virginians in the trench were notified and directed to fire upon the enemy in their front as rapidly as possible, in the language of the order, "to keep their heads down "; an order which was obeyed with a will, as nearly every man standing in the trench was supplied with several guns--his own, and one or more of the hundreds of captured guns which lay all along the trench. Not only when the charge was made, but all of the time after our men got in the trench did they fire from our breastworks at the enemy whenever they showed themselves along the crest or rim of the Crater, as they constantly did, or whenever they attempted to run the gauntlet from the Crater, across the field to their own works, a movement which was attempted by many and by some successfully.

About the crest of the Crater next to the Federal lines might be seen sometimes a man from the outside climbing over to get within the Crater, and sometimes a man from the inside climbing over to get outside. I remember seeing a gallant Federal officer mount the edge of the Crater at this point, and, with conspicuous bravery, wave his glittering sword overhead, as if calling on his men to follow him--a sight which commanded my admiration, as it must have done that of all who witnessed it.

An incident occurred about this time, or a little later in the morning, that I have often recalled. Happening in my immediate presence, it very deeply impressed me. In my company two men, Orderly Sergeant W. W. Tayleure and Private Buck Johnson, of the Petersburg Riflemen, came very near having a personal difficulty. Tayleure had been standing on the step, which was about nine inches above the floor of the trench, and upon which all men of ordinary height had to stand in order to be able to shoot from the parapet, and had been firing at the enemy from this position. Just at this time Buck Johnson, who had doubtless been engaged in the same way elsewhere, and who was never known to flinch, bearing a splendid reputation as a soldier, as, indeed, did Tayleure, happened to be standing on the floor of the trench. Tayleure asked him why he did not get up on the step and fire at the enemy. Johnson's high spirit promptly resented the imputation against his courage, implied in this question, and he used some very strong language to Tayleure. One word led to another, and the two men, both being of approved courage, were about to come to blows, when Joe Sacry, a member of the Richmond Grays, standing on the little step above mentioned, having just fired his gun, received a bullet in his head and fell lifeless at the feet of the two men. The quarrel instantly ceased. Poor Sacry's bleeding corpse substituted profound seriousness in the place of angry words, and I believe the needless quarrel was never renewed. Both Johnson and Tayleure served to maintain on several subsequent fields of battle the good name that each had already well won in their three years of active service.

Wright's brigade of Georgians about eleven o'clock is called upon to make another attempt to carry the works about the Crater and south of it, but, this like the first attempt, is unsuccessful. As on the occasion of the first charge, word is passed down the line to the men in the breastworks to fire rapidly to keep the enemy's heads down, and the order is in like manner obeyed.

What has been going on in the Crater? Those who were in it can best tell us, and I may, therefore, properly draw from the interesting address of Lieutenant Bowley above referred to. Here is what he says:

"With a dozen of my own company I went down the traverse to the crater. We were the last to reach it, and the rifles of the Union soldiers were flashing in our faces when we jumped down in there, and the Johnnies were not twenty yards behind us. A full line around crest of the crater were loading and firing as fast as they could, and the men were dropping thick and fast, most of them shot through the head. Every man that was shot rolled down the steep sides to the bottom, and in places they were piled up four and five deep. For a few minutes the fire was fearfully, sharp. Then the enemy sought shelter. The cries of the wounded, pressed down under the dead, were piteous in the extreme. An enfilading fire was coming through the traverse down which we had retreated. General Bartlett ordered the colored troops to build a breastworks across it. They commenced the work by throwing up lumps of clay, but it was slow work; some one called out, 'Put in the dead men,' and acting on this suggestion, a large number of dead, white and black, Union and rebel, were piled into the trench. This made a partial shelter, and enabled the working party to strengthen their breastworks. Cartridges were running low, and we searched the boxes of all the dead and wounded.

"The day was fearfully hot; the wounded were crying for water, and the canteens were empty. A few of our troops held a ditch a few feet in front of the crater and were keeping up a brisk fire. In the little calm that followed, we loaded a large number of muskets and placed them in readiness for instant use. Another movement was soon attempted by the enemy, but our fire was so sharp that they hastily sought cover. The artillery on Cemetery Hill and Wright's Battery kept up a constant fire of grape and kept the dirt flying about us. A mortar battery also opened on us; after a few shots, they got our range so well that the shells fell directly among us. Many of them did not explode at all, but a few burst directly over us and cut the men down most cruelly. Many of the troops now attempted to make our lines; but, to leave, they had to run up a slope in full view of the enemy, that now surrounded us on three sides; nearly every man who attempted it fell back riddled with bullets. At 11 o'clock a determined charge was made by the enemy; we repulsed it, but when the fire slackened the ammunition was fearfully low. About this time two men, each carrying all the cartridges he could manage in a piece of shelter tent, reached us.

"The white troops," continues Lieutenant Bowley, "were now exhausted and discouraged. Leaving the line, they sat down, facing inwards, and neither threats nor entreaties could get them up into line again. In vain was the cry raised that all would be killed if captured with negro soldiers; they would not stand up. From this time on the fire was kept up, mainly by the colored troops and officers handling muskets. A few Indians, of the First Michigan Sharpshooters, did splendid work. Some of them were mortally wounded, and drawing their blouses over their faces, they chanted a death-song and died--four of them in a group. An attempt had been made to dig a trench through the side of the crater towards the Union line, but the rebs got the range of that hole and plugged the bullets into it so thick and fast that no one would work in it. Of the men of my company who had rallied with me, all but one, a sergeant, lay dead or dying. The troops seemed utterly apathetic and indifferent. The killing of a comrade by their very sides would not rouse them in the least.

Between 1 and 2 o'clock in the afternoon our men in the ditch, outside the crater, had expended all their ammunition, and were quickly captured. Then the rebels planted their battle flags on the edge of the crater, front and both flanks, not six feet from our men. They quickly pulled them back, but we knew that they were there, just on the other side of the clay bank. Muskets, with bayonets, were pitched back and forth, harpoon style. In this last movement the Confederates exposed themselves most fearlessly, and had all our men stood up at that time, the rebel loss would have been much more severe. I have good reason to believe that my own revolver did some effective work at this point."

Here ends Lieutenant Bowley's account of what was transpiring in the Crater, and I will resume the narrative from our standpoint.

It is now about one o'clock. We receive another order to keep the enemy's heads down. A charge is about to be made, this time by the Alabama brigade, General Saunders, who form in the ravine from which the Virginians had charged, but farther south and accordingly more nearly opposite the Crater. The charge is successful--those who witnessed it say it was splendidly executed. The works are surrendered, and the prisoners pour out, making their way back, however, under a severe fire from their own batteries, some of them falling on the way.

What was here transpiring those of us in the breastworks to the north of the Crater could not see, but we immediately knew the result of the charge. From this time, during the balance of the day, every thing is comparatively quiet. When night carne on we are made to fall in line and move up the trench towards our right. In the trench that led around and to the rear of the Crater, dead men lie so thick that to walk along without stepping upon their bodies or limbs was very difficult.

Our movement to the right is ended when we have been so shifted as to bring the Riflemen immediately in the rear of the Crater. Here we are halted, and a detail of two or more men from each company is called for. Of this detail it falls to my lot to be one. What is to be done? The dead are to be buried! And this detail is to do the work! My horror can be better imagined than described. Before work commenced, somebody--who I do not know, but some one whose authority and orders in the premises, legal or illegal, I was prompt to recognize and obey--came along and put me in charge of a burying squad. I congratulated myself that I had no nearer connection with this disagreeable work. In a big grave, not a hundred feet in rear of the Crater, a large number of the bodies were placed. The work was done by a squad of negro prisoners. In the gray light of morning I went into the Crater, and there I saw the burying parties in this place still at work.

This gloomy night's work had at least one humorous incident. Our worthy commander, Comrade Hugh R. Smith, then adjutant of the Twelfth, I am glad to know, lives to-day to vouch for the correctness of what I am about to narrate:

Comrade Smith had selected for his night's rest a grassy spot near the men in the trench, all of whom, except those on guard or special duty, were fast asleep, and like them was wrapt in the arms of Morpheus. He had the advantage of his sleeping comrades, in that he had a soft and cool bed of grass upon which to rest; but he was in close vicinity to the pile of dead men then being buried. Things, however, were fairly evened up, when, some time during the small hours of the night, one of the negro prisoners, looking out for a corpse to bury, seized our gallant adjutant by the ankle and was hurrying him to the grave, when the adjutant, not then ready to be buried, awoke, to the great consternation of the poor prisoner, who thought he was handling a genuine corpse.

It is Sunday morning, and breakfast time. Are we to eat in this horrible place, the air filled with offensive odors from the presence of hundred of bodies still unburied, many of them within a radius of a few feet from us? Yes, or starve. My messmate and myself, I well remember, made our breakfast on hard-tack and fried pickle-pork. My impression is we had no coffee. I have a distinct recollection that the meal was not enjoyed.

It is in order just here to reproduce, for what they are worth as a contemporary record, the following entries in my diary, the first made during the afternoon of this day, the others on the days of their respective dates:

"Sunday, July 31, '64.--Yesterday witnessed a bloody drama around Petersburg, perhaps as bloody as any affair of the war, Fort Pillow not excepted. At this point, about half a mile southeast of the Old Blandford Church, the enemy exploded a mine under a fort in our works, blowing up four pieces of Pegram's battery with two lieutenants (Lieutenants Hamlin and Chandler) and twenty-two men, together with five companies of the 18th S. C. regiment, Elliott's brigade, whereupon they immediately rushed upon and captured that portion of our works and about two hundred yards of the works to the left of the exploded portion. This occurred soon after sunrise, soon alter which our brigade and Wright's, which occupied the extreme right of our line, were put in motion for this point, approaching it cautiously by the military roads recently constructed. We were not long in learning that our brigade would be assigned the task of capturing the works, supported by Wright. Arriving opposite the works, fortunately just at the moment we were about to charge, the enemy were also about to charge, when, seizing our advantage and rising with a yell we rushed forward and got into the works about one hundred yards distant, receiving but little fire from the enemy . . . Our brigade not driving the enemy from the inner portion of the exploded mine, Saunders and Wright's brigades finished the work. I have never seen such slaughter on any battlefield. Our regiment lost 27, killed and wounded, the majority of whom were killed, and among them Emmet Butts, of our company. Put Stith, of our company, was wounded. Colonel Weisiger, commanding the brigade, was wounded. From what I have seen, the enemy's loss could not have been less than from 500 to 700 killed, to say nothing of those wounded, and between five hundred and one thousand prisoners. Ours probably did not exceed 400 killed, wounded and missing. Negotiations under a flag of truce are now pending. Probably Grant wants to bury the dead between the lines. Permission was granted to water his wounded. I observed several citizens from the enemy's line take part in this act of humanity. They were probably members of the sanitary committee. I saw also a woman standing in the Yankee breastworks. We indulge a hope that our brigade will be relieved to-night and return to its quiet position on the right."

"Tuesday, August 2, 1864.--Back at Willcox's farm. Our brigade and Saunders' relieved last night. Truce for four hours yesterday morning for burying the dead between the lines. Express of this morning, states that 12 of our men were found between the lines and about 700 of the enemy. There could not have been as many as 700. We made the negro prisoners carry their dead comrades to the Yankee line, where the Yankees made their negroes bury them. Loss in our regiment 18 killed and 24 wounded. The Sixth regiment lost 70 killed and wounded out of 80 carried in the fight. The remainder of the regiment was on picket. Company C of sharpshooters, a detachment from the Twelfth, lost, out of fifteen, 5 killed and 8 wounded. The enemy admit a loss of over 4,000. Colonel Thomas, commanding one of the negro brigades, told Captain Jones (of our regiment), yesterday during the truce, that he carried in 2,200 men and brought out only 800.

"It is said that we captured 20 flags from the enemy, and that the prisoners captured represented two corps--9th (Burnside's) and 2nd (Hancock's).

"Thursday, August 4.--Yankee accounts of the affair put their loss in killed wounded and prisoners at 5,000. They say the plan was to spring a mine at 3 o'clock Saturday morning; but that the fuse failed to ignite the powder twice; that they had six tons of powder in the mine. The 9th and 18th corps made the charge, and the 5th was in reserve. Our losses foot up 1,200, of which 300 are no doubt prisoners--the enemy claiming to have taken that number."

"Saturday, August 6,--The loss of our brigade in the fight of Saturday was 270 killed wounded and missing, of whom 88 were killed on the field--just one-half of the whole number (176) that had been killed from the battle of the Wilderness to the present time."

"Monday, August 8, 1864.--General Mahone, in a congratulatory order to Mahone's, Saunders' and Wright's brigades for their conduct in the affair of Saturday, July 30, says that, with an effective force of less than 3,000 men and with a casualty list of 598, they killed 700 of the enemy's people, wounded, by his own account, over 3,000 and captured 1,101 prisoners, embracing 87 officers, 17 stands of colors, 2 guerdons and 1,916 stand of small arms--deeds which entitle their banners to the inscription, 'The Crater, Petersburg, July 30, 1864.' He says the enemy had massed against us three of his corps and two divisions of another."

The foregoing brief entries are all that I find in my diary relating to the battle.

From information subsequently obtained I am able to correct some of the statements therein made:

In Comrade W. Gordon McCabe's admirable address, entitled "The Defence of Petersburg," the accuracy and fullness of the information contained in which are only equalled by the clear and beautiful language in which it is conveyed, the statement is made that the loss of life caused by the explosion of the mine was 256 officers and men of the Eighteenth and Twenty-second South Carolina regiments and two officers and twenty men of Pegram's Petersburg battery. This battery was commanded by Captain Richard G. Pegram, who was absent on duty, and thus escaped what befell his two lieutenants, Hamlin and Chandler.

In a letter published in September, 1878, Dr. Hugh Toland, surgeon of the Eighteenth South Carolina, locates this regiment as on the left, or north, of Pegram's battery, and the Twenty-second South Carolina as on the right, or south, of this battery at the time of the explosion.

"My brigade," says Dr. Toland, "had suffered severely--the Twenty-second South Carolina had lost its gallant Colonel Fleming, and many a brave soldier. My regiment had lost 163 men. Two whole companies, A and C, Eighteenth South Carolina, had not a man left, who was on duty, to tell the tale. One hundred and one of my men, including Capts. McCormich and Bridges were dead--buried in the Crater or scattered along the works--and 62 missing."

Giving the Federal loss in this engagement, Captain McCabe in his address says:

"In this grand assault on Lee's lines, for which Meade had massed 65,000 troops, the enemy suffered a loss of 5,000 men, including 1,101 prisoners, among whom were two brigade commanders, whilst vast quantities of small arms and twenty-one standards fell into the hands of the victors."

The quantity of powder used in exploding the mine was not six tons, but 8,000 pounds. "The charge," says Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Pleasants, of the Forty-eighth Pennsylvania Veteran Volunteers, the originator of the mine, in his report of the explosion," consisted of three hundred and twenty kegs of powder, each containing about twenty-five pounds. It was placed in eight magazines, connected with each other by troughs half filled with powder. These troughs from the lateral galleries met at the inner end of the main one, and from this point I had three lines of fuses for a distance of 98 feet. Not having fuses as long as required, two pieces had to be spliced together to make the required length of each of the lines."

In the concluding paragraph of this report Colonel Pleasants says:

"I stood on top of our breastworks and witnessed the effect of the explosion on the enemy. It so completely paralyzed them that the breach was practically four or five hundred yards in breadth. The rebels in the forts, both on the right and left of the explosion, left their works, and for over an hour not a shot was fired by their artillery. There was no fire from infantry from the front for at least half an hour; none from the left for twenty minutes, and but few shots from the right."

Major W. H. Powell, acting aide-de-camp of General Ledlie, the commander of the first division of the Ninth corps, at the time of the explosion, in his article entitled "The Tragedy of the Crater," published in the September (1887) number of the Century, says:

"I returned immediately, and just as I arrived in rear of the first division the mine was sprung. It was a magnificent spectacle, and as the mass of earth went up into the air, carrying with it men, guns, carriages and timbers, and spread out like an immense cloud as it reached its altitude, so close were the Union lines that the mass appeared as if it would descend immediately upon the troops waiting to make the charge. This caused them to break and scatter to the rear, and about ten minutes were consumed in reforming for the attack. Not much was lost by this delay, however, as it took nearly that time for the cloud of dust to pass off. * * *

"Little did those men anticipate what they would see upon arriving there: an enormous hole in the ground about 30 feet deep, 60 feet wide and 170 feet long, filled with dust, great blocks of clay, guns, broken carriages, projecting timbers, and men buried in various ways--some up to their necks, others to their waists, and some with only their feet and legs protruding from the earth. * * *

"The whole scene of the explosion," continues Major Powell, "struck every one dumb with astonishment as we arrived at the crest of the debris. It was impossible for the troops of the Second Brigade to move forward in line, as they had advanced; and owing to the broken state they were in, every man crowding up to look into the hole, and being pressed by the First brigade, which, was immediately in rear, it was equally impossible to move by the flank, by any command, around the crater. Before the brigade commanders could realize the situation, the brigades became inextricably mixed in the desire to look into the hole. * * * * *"

From the next paragraph of Major Powell's article it appears that Colonel Pleasants was in error as to the extent of the demoralization of the Confederates incident upon the explosion, as the South Carolinians in the trenches near the Crater were quick to recover their equanimity and to make the incoming Federals feel their presence. In this paragraph this Federal officer says:

"However, Colonel Marshall yelled to the Second brigade to move forward, and the men did so, jumping, sliding and tumbling into the hole, over the debris of material, and dead and dying men, and huge blocks of solid clay. They were followed by General Bartlett's brigade. Up on the other side of the Crater they climbed, and while a detachment stopped to place two of the dismounted guns of the battery in position on the enemy's side of the crest of the Crater, a portion of the leading brigade passed over the crest and attempted to reform. It was at this period that they found they were being killed by musket-shots from the rear, fired by the Confederates, who were still occupying the traverses and intrenchments to the right and left of the Crater. These men had been awakened by the noise and shock of the explosion, and during the interval before the attack had recovered their equanimity, and when the Union troops attempted to reform on the enemy's side of the Crater, they had faced about and delivered a fire into the backs of our men. This coming so unexpectedly caused the forming line to fall back into the Crater."

. . .

It will be asked what was the number of Federal soldiers who were actually in possession of our works at the time of the charge made by Mahone's brigade.

As the expression, "an effective force of not less than 3,000 men," used in General Mahone's congratulatory order to the three brigades, Mahone's, Wright's, and Saunders', embraced not only the force of about 800 men of Mahone's brigade who made the charge a little before nine o'clock in the morning, but also the forces engaged in the several unsuccessful charges made by Wright's brigade and the final successful charge made about one o'clock in the afternoon by Saunders' brigade, and probably the co-operating artillery and other infantry, so the statement made by General Mahone in this order that "the enemy had massed against us three of his corps and two divisions of another," and Captain McCabe's statement that "Meade had massed" for the assault "65,000 troops," must be understood as embracing not only those who were actually in possession of our works but those immediately in, or massed a short distance behind, the Federal works near by, who were taking part or ready to take part in the affair.

But we are not without data by which to ascertain the probable number of men that occupied the Confederate works when the Virginia brigade numbering about eight hundred men dashed forward, in the manner that has been described, to engage in what every man knew would be a death-struggle for their possession. General Mahone's congratulatory order places the flags captured at seventeen; Captain McCabe gives twenty-one as the number of standards captured. We will take General Mahone's figures and estimate each of the seventeen regiments represented by the seventeen flags as containing two hundred and fifty men--a fair average for a veteran regiment in the Federal army at that time. This done, and we have a force of 4,250 men.

But this average is manifestly too small, when we consider the statement of Colonel Henry G. Thomas, who commanded the Second brigade of the Fourth division (Ferrero's) of the Ninth corps, made in his article in the September number, 1887, of the Century, entitled "The Colored Troops at Petersburg," in which he says:

"There was but one division of colored troops in the Army of the Potomac--the Fourth division of the Ninth corps--organized as follows: * * * * *

"This made a division of only nine regiments, divided into two brigades, yet it was numerically a large division. The regiments were entirely full, and a colored deserter was a thing unknown. On the day of the action the division numbered 4,300, of which 2,000 belonged to Seigfried's brigade and 2,300 to mine."

To assume that the number of flags captured represented the total number of regiments at the place of capture leads to a very erroneous result. So far from there being only seventeen regiments in our works, there were probably more than double this number.
There went into our works three white divisions, the First (Ledlie's), the Second (Potter's), and the Third (Wilcox's), of the Ninth (Burnside) corps, about four regiments excepted, and after these the colored division of General Ferrero. This appears from the following paragraph in the testimony of Lieutenant-Colonel Charles G. Loring, of General Burnside's staff, before the Committee on the Conduct of the War:

"General Ledlie's division was to go in first; the whole of that division went into the Crater, or lines immediately adjoining. Genera Potter's division was to go in next, but to go in on the right of the other. I did not see them and I do not know how many of them went into the Crater. I simply saw the head of the column going in. I understood that they all went into the enemy's lines; but I cannot say positively about that. General Wilcox's division also went in at the same place where General Ledlie's division went in. I think four of his regiments--I am not sure of the number--failed to get in. In starting from our line they bore off too much to the left and came back to our own line, and did not go in. I think that with that exception the whole of General Wilcox's division went into the enemy's lines. The regiments of his division went in at different times, not as a division, but disjointedly. And at half-past seven, about two hours and a half after the mine exploded, the whole of the colored division went in at the same point."

If the three white divisions numbered each nine regiments (the number of the regiments in the colored division), they aggregated twenty-seven regiments. Deduct the four regiments of Wilcox's division, referred to by Colonel Loring, allow two hundred and fifty men to each of the twenty-four remaining regiments, and we have 6,000 men. To these add the 4,300 colored troops, and there was an aggregate of 10,300 men! And this without counting a brigade of General Turner's division of the Eighteenth corps, which, according to his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, took possession of about one hundred yards of our works to the north of the Crater.

General Ord, in his testimony before the committee, by implication, puts the number of men who went into the Confederate works at 10,000 or 12,000, when he says:

"The ground to the left and front of the mine was marshy and covered by bushes and trees. No preparations had been made for our troops to pass out to our right or left. They could only get out by a single long trench or covered way; so that in the slow process of getting 10,000 or 12,000 men up through this narrow space and through a single opening the enemy had an opportunity to make preparations to meet them. All this produced delay."

With facts and figures like these to sustain the assertion, we are warranted in stating that the force against which our little band of about eight hundred Virginians was hurled, outnumbered their assailants more than ten to one!

But whilst the highest credit belongs to the Virginia brigade for its achievements on this occasion, it must be remembered that bad management in the disposition of the Federal forces greatly assisted in producing the result. No troops, crowded as were the Federals in the Crater and in the trenches on either side, the latter having a perfect net work of traverses and bomb-proofs, which greatly impeded the Federals in resisting an assault from the west, or Confederate side of our works, could well have met a determined assault made from this direction. "These pits," says Colonel Thomas in his Century article, referring to the trenches at this place, "were different from any in our lines--a labyrinth of bomb-proofs and magazines, with passages between."

How far towards Cemetery Ridge, that is to say, west of the Confederate works, did the Federal forces advance at any time during their four hours' occupation of these works, is a question which naturally arises, and was asked several of the witnesses in the official investigation made by the Federal government. Extracts from some of the testimony before the court of inquiry, held at the headquarters of General Hancock on the 1st of September, 1864, will give us some light upon this point:

Brigadier-General S. G. Griffin, who commanded a brigade of Potter's division, on the stand:

"Ques.--Did your command go beyond the Crater? "Ans.--It did. "Ques.--About how far?
"Ans.--I should judge about two hundred yards. It might be more, or it might be less. It could not have been much less, however; that is as near as I can judge."

Colonel H. G. Thomas, commanding the Second brigade of Ferrero's (colored) division, on the stand:

"Ques.--Did you get beyond the line of the Crater with your troops?
"Ans.--I did, sir.
"Ques.--How far?
"Ans--I should say about between three and four hundred yards to the right of the Crater and in front of it. I was ordered to support the first brigade when it made its charge." Colonel Thomas' last answer giving no definite information as to the position of his troops in advance of the Confederate works, and the court manifestly having a doubt as to his troops having gone to the west of these works at all, he is asked the pointed question: "Did you get beyond the enemy's line?" He replies: "I did, sir; I led a charge which was not successful. The moment I reached the first brigade I started out the Thirty-first colored regiment, which was in front, but it lost its three ranking officers in getting in position, and did not go out well." The witness's answer, whilst responsive to the question, like his answer to the preceding question, gives no light as to the point west of the Confederate works reached by his command.

The next witness, however, testifies very clearly, and probably gives the most accurate information as to the position reached by the troops that moved forward west of the Confederate works. The witness is Lieutenant-Colonel Charles S. Russell, commanding the Twenty-eighth U. S. colored troops, of Colonel Thomas' brigade. Being asked the question" How far in advance did you get towards Cemetery Hill?" he replies: "Not exceeding fifty yards. We were driven back."

"By what?" is the next question asked this witness. He replies: "I should judge by about two or four hundred men (infantry), which rose from a little ravine and charged us. Being all mixed up and in confusion, and new troops, we had to come back."

The witness is in error as to the number of the Confederates who "rose up from the little ravine," as they were the men of the Virginia brigade, whose number was approximated by General Griffin, when he said: "Five or six hundred men were all we could see. I did not see either the right or the left of the line. I saw the centre of the line as it appeared to me. It was a good line of battle."

Of the condition of things in the Crater and in trenches when the three white divisions had entered the Confederate works and the colored division was about to go in, about 7 o'clock in the morning, General Turner, who commanded a division of the Eighteenth (Ord's) corps, gives a graphic description in his testimony before the committee. He says:

"When the head of my column reached the point at which our assaulting column had passed through our lines, it was, as near as I recollect, about 7 o'clock. I jumped up on a parapet to observe what was going on. Immediately in front of me lay the Crater, about seventy-five yards distant. The men were in it and around it in great confusion; they were lying down, seeking shelter from the fire of the enemy, which at that time had become exceedingly warm. The enemy had succeeding in getting a cross fire of artillery and musketry over the ground lying between our line and the Crater.

* * * My idea was that the 9th corps would penetrate the enemy's line and double them up to the right and to the left, and then I was to pass out and cover the right flank of the assaulting column; but the enemy still held possession of their lines up to within one hundred yards of the Crater when I arrived, which surprised me. It left me no alternative of going out anywhere but directly opposite the Crater, where the 9th corps went out. I could see no movement taking place beyond the Crater towards Cemetery Hill * * * The troops lay very thick in and around the Crater, evidently more than could find cover from the enemy's fire.

* * * The Crater was full of men; they were lying all around, and every point that would give cover to a man was occupied. There was no movement towards Cemetery Hill; the troops were all in confusion and lying down. I asked one or two officers there if an attempt had been made to move to Cemetery Hill. They said the attempt had been made, but it had failed. I then said, 'You ought to entrench your position here, and you have too many troops here already to intrench. There are so many troops here that they are in each other's way; they are only exposed to this terrific fire of the enemy,' which was then growing warmer and warmer, and was a very severe fire. While I was talking to an officer--we had sought shelter in the Crater--the head of the colored division appeared at the crest of the Crater, and the division commenced piling over into the Crater and passing across it on the other side as well as they could. I exclaimed, 'What are these men sent in here for? It is only adding confusion to the confusion which already exists.' The men literally came falling over into this Crater on their hands and knees; they were so thick in there that a man could not walk. Seeing that I was going to be covered up, and be entirely useless, I thought I would go out. As I had no control over these troops, and supposing there were officers in command, I said, 'If you can get these troops beyond this line so that I can get out, I will move my division right out and cover your right flank; and I went back for the purpose of doing so. I met General Ord on our line at the head of my division. I said, 'General, unless a movement is made out of the Crater towards Cemetery Hill, it is murder to send more men in there. That colored division should never have been sent in there; but there is a furor there, and perhaps they may move off sufficiently for me to pass my division out.'"

General Ord, in his testimony, using vigorous language, says:

"The men had to go through a long, narrow trench, about one* third of a mile in length, before they got into our extreme out-work, and then they went into this Crater, and were piled into that hole, where they were perfectly useless. They were of about as much use there as so many men at the bottom of a well."

The stampede which took place when Mahone's brigade made its charge is thus described by General Turner in his testimony:

"I had got, probably, half way between our line and the enemy's lines--which were perhaps only a hundred yards apart at that point, and it was a very broken country, thick underbrush and morass--when, looking to the left, I saw the troops in vast numbers coming rushing back, and immediately my whole first brigade came back, and then my second brigade on my right, and everything was swept back in and around the Crater, and probably all but about one-third of the original number stampeded back right into our lines. After some exertion I rallied my men of the First and Second brigades after they got into our lines, while my Third brigade held the line."

General Carr, who commanded a division of the Eighteenth corps, in his testimony thus describes the stampede:

"I saw a vacancy--a gap that I thought about four regiments would fill, and assist that line of battle that was going over our breastworks to take those rifle pits. I immediately took command of part of Turner's division, and ordered them over the line to join the line of troops then advancing, and told them to charge the rifle-pits in their front, which they did. That was about two hundred yards on the right of the Crater. After putting those troops in, I stepped back from the entrenchment some ten or fifteen yards towards the covered way, and I had scarcely got back to the lower end of the covered way when the stampede began, and I suppose two thousand troops came back, and I was lifted from my feet by the rushing mass, and carried along with it ten or fifteen yards in the covered way. What staff I had with me assisted me in stopping the crowd in the covered way, and in putting some of them in position in the second line; some were in the first. I left General Potter in the covered way."

I would like to give more extracts from the sworn and other statements of our adversaries as to what was done and omitted to be done on this memorable day, which marked an event altogether exceptional in the history of the war; but I fear that I have already drawn from these sources of information to the point of prolixity.

Although all matters of controversy would in this address gladly have been avoided, I cannot pass unnoticed a remarkable paragraph in Colonel Alfred Roman's work, "The Military Operations of General Beauregard."

At page 267, after mentioning General Meade's order to General Burnside to withdraw his troops, given at 9:45 A. M., and the orders given to General Hancock, at 9:25 and to General Warren at 9:45, "to suspend all offensive operations," Colonel Roman, basing his statement upon statements made by General Bushrod Johnson and Colonel F. W, McMaster, says:

"Such was the situation--the Federals unable to advance and fearing to retreat--when, at 10 o'clock, General Mahone arrived with a part of his men, who lay down in the shallow ravine, to the rear of Elliott's salient, held by the force under Colonel Smith, there to await the remainder of the division. But a movement having occurred among the Federals which seemed to menace an advance, General Mahone threw forward his brigade, with the Sixty-first North Carolina, of Hoke's division, which had now also come up. The Twenty-fifth and Forty-ninth North Carolina, and the Twenty-sixth and part of the Seventeenth South Carolina, all under Smith, which were formed on Mahone's left, likewise formed in the counter-movement, and three-fourths of the gorge-line were carried with part of the trench on the left of the Crater occupied by the Federals. Many of the latter, white and black, abandoned the breach and fled to their lines, under a scourging flank fire from Wise's brigade."

The statement here made that the charge was made by Mahone's brigade, with the Sixty-first, Twenty-fifth and Forty-ninth North Carolina and the Twenty-sixth and part of the Seventeenth South Carolina regiments, is as clearly incorrect as is the statement that Mahone arrived about ten o'clock, after General Meade issued his orders above referred to.

Against this statement as to time we may safely place that of Colonel Venable, of General Lee's staff, made in 1872, in which he says: "I know that it is difficult to be accurate as to time on the battle-field, unless noted and written down at the moment. But I am confident this charge of the Virginians was made before 9 o'clock A. M. I know, from my recollection of the notes received and answered by General Lee, that after the charge, the formation of the Georgia brigade, under Colonel Hall, was completed, and after some delay was moved around under the slope, more to the right, and made a charge at 10 o'clock to recover that portion of the line on the right of the Crater."

But we are not without a contemporaneous record to prove beyond all controversy that the charge of Mahone's brigade was made prior to 9 o'clock A. M., and therefore to the several orders issued by General Meade to suspend operations and withdraw the troops.

General Meade, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, says:

"At 9 A. M. I received the following dispatch from General Burnside:

[ By telegraph from Headquarters Ninth Army Corps.]
"'9 A. M., July 30, 1864.

"'GEN. MEADE:
"' Many of the Ninth (9th) and Eighteenth (18th) corps are retiring before the enemy. (5th) corps promptly.
I think now is the time to put in the Fifth

"'A. E. BURNSIDE,
"'Major-General.

"'[Official.]

"'S. F. BARSTOW,
"'Assistant Adjutant-General.'

"That was the first information I had received that there was any collision with the enemy, or that there was any enemy present. At 9:30 A. M. the following dispatch was sent to General Burnside:

"'HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

"'July 30, 1864--9:30 A. M.

"' Major-General BURNSIDE, Commanding Ninth Corps:
"'The major-general commanding has heard that the result of your attack has been a repulse, and directs that if, in your judgment, nothing further can be effected, that you withdraw to your own line, taking every precaution to get the men back safely.

"'A. A. HUMPHREYS,
"' Major-General and Chief of Staff.

"' General Ord will do the same.

"' A. A. HUMPHREYS,
"' Major-General and Chief of Staff.

"' Official:

"' S. F. BARSTOW,
"'Assistant Adjutant- General.'

"Then I received the following dispatch from Captain Sanders:

[By telegraph from Headquarters Ninth Army Corps.]

"'9 A. M., July 30, 1864.

"' To Major-General MEADE:
"'The attack made on right of mine has been repulsed. A great many men are coming in the rear.

"'W. W. SANDERS,
" 'Captain and C. M.

"' Official:

"' S. F. BARSTOW,
"'Assistant Adjutant-General.'"

The Committee on the Conduct of the War, in their report, made after all of the testimony bearing on the subject, oral and documentary, had been heard and considered, fully appreciating the importance of stating correctly the order of sequence and accordingly the exact time of the occurrence of the several military movements which were the subject of the committee's investigation, say:

"The Fourth (colored) division was also ordered to advance, and did so under a heavy fire. They succeeded in passing the white troops, already in, but in a disorganized condition. They reformed to some extent and attempted to charge the hill in front, but without success, and broke in disorder to the rear. This was about 8:45 A. M. about four hours after the explosion of the mine. * *

"At 9:45 A. M. General Burnside received a peremptory order from General Meade to withdraw his troops.

"The troops were withdrawn between 1 and 2 o'clock in considerable confusion, caused by an assault of the enemy, and returned to the lines they had occupied in the morning."

The error of Colonel Roman in placing the orders of General Meade to his corps commanders to suspend operations and withdraw their troops anterior to the charge made by the Virginia brigade, shows exceptional want of care in the preparation of matter published to the world as history. Especially is this true, as Colonel Roman was a staff-officer of General Beauregard, and ought to have been better informed as to the subject whereof he wrote.

As to the statement that other troops besides the Virginia brigade made the charge, and that these troops were four regiments and part of a fifth, it may be safely affirmed that this is not according to the recollection of any of the men of Mahone's brigade who participated in the charge.

Captain W. Gordon McCabe, who was the adjutant of Colonel William J. Pegram's battalion of artillery, was an eye-witness of the charge. In an account of what he saw, sent me to-day, he says:

"At a little before 7 A. M. Colonel Pegram reported with two batteries (Brander's and 'the Purcell') at Bushrod Johnson's headquarters, which were east of the road and immediately north of the present first entrance to Blandford Cemetery.

"General Johnson knew nothing of the extent of the disaster. He had not even been to the front. General Lee came up while I was there, Colonel Pegram having gone to the front to see where to put his guns.

"Colonel Pegram returned in a few minutes, and as, on account of the severe fire sweeping the plank-road, we could not move the guns up that road, we went back toward town until we struck the ravine. We pulled our guns along the ravine until we came to the reservoir. We went up the ravine along the course of Lieutenant Run to a point near the bridge on New Road, which road being commanded by the enemy's guns, we had to ascend the hill to the north of this road. The hill is very steep there, or was. We left our caissons in the ravine at the foot of the reservoir, 'doubled teams' on the guns and pulled them square up this almost perpendicular hill. It was the steepest pull I ever saw during the war. We then moved forward and came into battery about fifty yards in the rear of the right of the Gee House, a commanding position on the west side of the plank-road about five hundred yards in rear of the Crater.

"Our orders were not to fire at all, unless the enemy attempted to reinforce the troops in the Crater, or the troops there attempted to advance to Cemetery Hill. We ran up piles of cannister in front of each gun, and then had to stand idle and take a heavy fire. Colonel Pegram and I went forward to the Gee house to see what was going on. We went up stairs and peeped through the bullet-holes (for the whole place was riddled with bullets and was being further riddled while we were there). From this position I saw Mahone's men lying down in the ravine. I saw no troops to their right or left. Suddenly they jumped up, and with a wild yell charged and carried the position occupied by the enemy north of the Crater. I never saw a thing done so quickly. Pegram and I yelled and clapped our hands and ran back and told our men. It was the first good news we had to tell that day. 'Tantum vidi,' as the Roman says. We pulled out of our position at sunset."

There may possibly have been, and I have no doubt but that there were, a few individual members of these Carolina regiments who charged along with Mahone's brigade, but if any organized body, or bodies of troops, made the charge along with the Virginians, this important fact has hitherto wholly escaped the attention of the men of this brigade.

That there was gross mismanagement on the part of the Federals, in not so arranging and handling their troops as to place them in possession of Cemetery Ridge within a few minutes after the explosion of the mine, none can dispute.

That the gallant South Carolinians of Elliot's brigade up to the date of the fall of their brave leader, General Stephen Elliott, and subsequently under the leadership of Colonel F. W. McMaster, did their full duty, as did other infantry, by their fire from the flanks, none will deny.

That the artillery occupying the forts to the right and left and stationed in rear of the Crater rendered most effective service is beyond question.

That the Alabama brigade made the final successful charge has never been disputed.

But that the charge of the Virginia brigade, commanded by General D. A. Weisiger and directed by General William Mahone, made a little before nine o'clock in the morning, did the substantial work that led to the recapture of the Crater and the adjacent earthworks, is a fact that will always stand out boldly on the pages of history, and the fame of the brigade for its part in this brilliant action, increasing as time rolls on, will shine out in the imperishable records of the late war long after its actors shall have passed away.

Weisiger was an impetuous, dashing man, among the bravest of the brave; Mahone, cool, courageous and able, was by nature fitted for generalship as few men are, and none knew this better than the men of his command. Wherever he led or placed them, they always felt a moral certainty that they were being properly led or placed, either to inflict the most damage on the enemy or to have the enemy inflict the least damage on them. Accordingly, on the morning of the charge at the Crater, there was not a man in the brigade, knowing that General Mahone was present, personally superintending and directing the movement, that did not feel that we were to be properly and skilfully handled, and would be put in just when and where the most effective service could be rendered. This impression of these two commanders of the old brigade, whose names have passed into history along with that of the command, I have felt that justice requires that I should here record.

I feel, too, that I should not pass in silence the gallant southerner, Captain V. J. Girardey, who was serving on General Mahone's staff at the time of the action, and won by his conduct the commission of a brigadier-general, dating from the 30th of July, 1864, and whose splendid conduct on this and previous occasions had commanded the admiration of all of the men of our brigade.

Nor should I pass in silence the daring deeds of Privates Dean and Valentine, of the Twelfth. As the line was forming for the charge, each picked out and pointed to a stand of Federal colors and said he meant to have it. On the charge, before reaching the works, Valentine received a wound from which he never recovered, and Dean was killed. Both men were members of the Petersburg Old Grays.

I have now, comrades, finished my story of the Crater--not, however, without a painful sense that as a record of this historic battle it is very incomplete. Many brave and gallant deeds done by men on both sides have not been mentioned. To Captain McCabe's splendid narrative, already mentioned, to the Century articles and other documents from which I have so freely drawn, and to the many old soldiers who participated in the action, yet alive, I must refer for much that I have necessarily omitted, as for instance, for such deeds of valor as those of Captain Wallace Broadbent, on the Confederate side, who fell pierced by eleven bayonet wounds, and of Lieutenant-Colonel John A. Bross, on the Federal side, who, attired in full uniform, fell riddled with bullets as he was conspicuously rallying his men for a forward move. What has been narrated to-night must be received only as a private soldier's individual impressions of the action, formed partly from personal knowledge and partly from information obtained from others and believed to be authentic. If the story told has interested or contributed to a clearer understanding of how the battle was fought and won, it will have served its purpose.

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